malaysia defense 20may02

asiaco

Malaysia has developed an increasingly important profile for U.S. policy in the region for several reasons. In addition to the enthusiasm with which Mahathir has jailed alleged terrorists, he will also play a key role in the Bush administration's efforts to woo "moderate" Muslims as part of the war on terrorism. Mahathir will chair the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) beginning in 2003. And next year's OIC summit will be hosted by Malaysia for the first time. These factors all insure that human rights issues are unlikely to be a centerpiece of the Bush-Mahathir discussions.

There are broader regional security issues as well that weave together Bush administration security concerns, efforts to promote U.S. weapons exports, and Malaysia's military modernization program. The ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are expected to spend $ 3 billion on weapons this year, with Malaysia spending the largest single amount. Prior to the Asian crisis, Southeast Asia was the world's second-largest arms market after the Middle East. Southeast Asian arms purchases represented about 20% of the world market in the mid-1990s, a substantial increase over the region's 12% market share in 1985. Malaysia plans to spend $3-4 billion on weapons from 2002-2005 as part of a major military modernization program.

Malaysian Defense Minister Najib Razak is the driving force behind the modernization program. This program is actually the renewal of an effort begun in the early 1990s, also led by Najib, to shift the Malaysian military from an army-driven, counter-insurgency force to a structure with a more equal emphasis on all three services. That effort was derailed when Najib was moved from the defense ministry to another portfolio in 1995 and then placed on hold by the Asian economic crisis.

The shopping list includes battle tanks from Poland, Russian and British surface-to-air missiles and mobile military bridges, Austrian Steyr assault rifles, and Pakistani anti-tank missiles. Kuala Lumpur is also negotiating to buy several F/A-18s, three submarines from France, and an unspecified number of Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighter aircraft. The decision to spread its orders around reflects Malaysia's use of arms purchases as part of its foreign policy, even though the range of equipment from so many different sources creates maintenance and logistics problems. The tanks, missiles, multiple-rocket-launcher systems, and submarines will give Malaysia an attack platform for the first time.

The military modernization program is partially aimed at narrowing the gap with neighboring Singapore, which has an annual military budget roughly twice the size of Malaysia's. There's also the mundane but important element of patronage. Many foreign arms manufacturers generally use well-connected Malaysians as their lobbyists for contracts. The commission paid to such representatives is estimated to range from 10-20%.

Several other major concerns are also driving military spending in Malaysia. One involves regional instability particularly, but not exclusively, in Indonesia. Then there is piracy in the Malacca Straits. The dramatic fall in pirate attacks in the Straits from 75 in 2000 to 17 in 2001 is largely attributable to increased patrols by the Royal Malaysian Marine Police. Finally, there is China. Malaysia is concerned about an increase of Chinese influence in the South China Sea. There is also a growing concern regarding the organizational weakness of ASEAN. This has been interpreted by policymakers in individual ASEAN countries as dictating increases in military spending as a counter-weight to China's military modernization efforts